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Commentary on Dependent Disclaimers
by Katheleen R. Guzman
Bich-Nga H. Nguyen*
In Dependent Disclaimers,1 Katheleen R. Guzman shines a spotlight on the difficulty of attempting to achieve a laudable estate tax savings objective, one that would maximize property passing to a
decedent’s family unit, by disclaiming on behalf of a minor heir such
child’s potential property interest arising by virtue of the child’s parent’s
own disclaimer, both in favor of the decedent’s surviving spouse, in
whose hands the property would not be subject to estate tax. Examining
In re Friedman,2 she observes that the necessity of filing a petition seeking court approval for such a disclaimer leaves judges to assess the merits of the proposed action within a legal framework that is currently
inadequate to permit making a holistic, non-financial best interests determination for the minor.3 The tax-inefficient estate disposition left to
families in this position presents them with the dilemma of resigning
themselves to the tax liability or asking their youngest and most vulnerable members effectively to forsake individual inheritances by disclaiming in favor of the collective family good, and presents the courts with
the unenviable task of reviewing “through a stilted ‘best interests’ policy
lens”4 whether to sanction such disclaimers by parents on behalf of children. The taxpayer-friendly goal of maximizing family wealth is certainly a sympathetic one – why write a check to Uncle Sam when the
money could instead pass to the grieving widow or widower, sheltered
by the estate tax marital deduction, thereby remaining within the family
eventually to pass back down to the disclaimants (especially when surely
this is what the decedent intended and would have directed had he or
she better understood the tax implications)? But the proposal laid out
by Professor Guzman, although it illuminates some legal assumptions
inherent in the current evaluative framework that are rightly questioned, itself rests on some wobbly legs that should be addressed and
* Bich-Nga H. Nguyen is an associate in the Trusts and Estates Department of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP. She is a member of the New York State Bar.
The views expressed herein are her own.
1 Katheleen R. Guzman, Dependent Disclaimers, 42 ACTEC L.J. (forthcoming
Apr. 2017) (manuscript at 2) (on file with ACTEC Law Journal).
2 7 N.Y.S.3d 845 (Sur. Ct. 2015).
3 Guzman, supra note 1, at 12.
4 Id. at 2.
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considered, lest the proposed solution inadvertently jettison or undermine sound safeguards for the sake of too few.
One of the key elements of Professor Guzman’s proposal is to
change the standard of judicial review of petitions to make a dependent
disclaimer, from a consideration of the traditional best interests of the
minor disclaimant, which she believes currently drives judges “toward a
reductionist bottom line”5 of considering only the financial consequences of the disclaimer – leading to disallowance on account of the
potential property passing through the hands of the child to the ultimate
taker – to a presumption, if such petitions to disclaim are reviewed at
all, that the disclaimer meets the best interests test, with the burden to
show otherwise shifted to a party with standing to object.6 Furthermore,
the best interests test should be expanded to allow for consideration of
factors other than financial.7 The other key element of the proposal is
adopting the classification of “non-property”8 for the minor’s inchoate
expectancy in the property to be disclaimed by the parent, reducing its
significance in harmony with the minimal judicial examination standard
proposed for a petition by the parent to make the dependent disclaimer.
Although Professor Guzman puts forth strong arguments in support of her proposed best interests presumption, there are questions
likely to nag a court that could hinder adoption: Is it safe to presume the
parent and child’s interests are precisely aligned? For the most vulnerable of minor disclaimants – the only child with no relative other than the
parent and grandparent (petitioning to act in collusion to disclaim the
child’s interest in their presumed collective favor) – who else would
have standing to object? Isn’t independent court review precisely the
protection required in this situation? The risk to the child of permanent
loss of property may be too high a price absent it.
It is difficult to argue that the “false binary”9 created by a too
“cramped”10 view of best interests cannot be improved upon. However,
an expansive concept of the best interests of the minor disclaimant, such
that an evaluation “would not focus strictly on the financial consequences for the child, but would also consider such important factors as
family harmony and stability,”11 introduces its own difficulties in implementation. The courts are accustomed to evaluating a fiduciary’s performance based on financial outcome – the fiduciary accounting
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proceeding is premised on precisely that. Such a quantification of best
interest is simple to evaluate. Where other non-numeric factors are required or desired to be considered, the prudent fiduciary who seeks to
demonstrate due care and diligence may turn to child psychologists or
therapists to bolster the court record in support of a decision or action,
and a court may require same, mitigating the anticipated saved costs of
the proposal.12 Additionally, although the modified best interests standard proposed is for the specific facts of a dependent disclaimer, and
therefore sets the bar for, most likely, the parent of the child disclaimant, it could be viewed as simply a different standard applicable favorably to a family or parental guardian versus a third party fiduciary – one
that may not be tenable if the fiduciaries perform and are required to
account for similar actions.
Professor Guzman explains quite cogently that the minor dependent disclaimant’s interest is “but the doubly contingent possibility of
non-expectant and conditional share”13 – a bundle of rights so nebulous
that it warrants classification as “non-property” at best,14 and, after extensive comparison of the dependent disclaimer to other doctrines by
which parents may affect their descendants’ property interests relative
to the level of review to which the parent is subject upon exercise, concludes that parental review upon making a dependent disclaimer should
be “very light indeed.”15 And so in reviewing cases that reached a similar result as Friedman, she hones in on “what seems to be a bias against
tax-driven disclaimers as much as some concern over how doing so
would affect the rights of a minor.”16 Statements in the cited cases lend
support to that observation, but it could not be that an aversion to tax
savings, or avoidance, is the primary determinant in these rulings. After
all, all disclaimers contain a tax-saving element; but for section 2518 of
the Code, the affirmative act of refusing to accept a bequest and allowing it to pass to the next taker under a will or pursuant to intestacy
would itself generate a gift tax liability for the disclaimant.17 So permitting any disclaimer at all aids and abets tax savings. With respect to the
rarer and circumstance-specific dependent disclaimer, however, the
judges whose opinions are cited by Professor Guzman could also simply
be less comfortable than she with the notion that the minor disclaimant’s interest is “non-property” to be so easily cast aside and facilitated by the court’s imprimatur of a favorable decision. The legal
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rationale as to why minor child B’s bundle of sticks “is not even an inchoate expectancy” and “does not even warrant a name”18 may be
sound, but it is not difficult to imagine a judge trying to reconcile the
idea that in the hands of minor child B it is a nothing, yet disclaiming
that same bundle of sticks results in a very real and substantial estate tax
saving to parent and grandparent and ostensibly the extended family
unit. Surely, then, it must be worth something to minor child B, and
even if not articulable, surely something worth protecting under a conservative approach. Perhaps the court factors in to the value of the bundle of sticks an element that Professor Guzman does not discuss – the
role of the unforeseeable proverbial bus. Suppose that, while waiting
for the court to issue its decision on whether she could disclaim on behalf of her child, to decide whether she herself will disclaim her vested
interest, the parent of minor child B in Friedman crosses the street and
is struck and killed by the proverbial bus – suddenly, minor child B’s
bundle of sticks has vested and become a very choate interest. The potential of complete transformation of the bundle of sticks by the wildcard variable of the proverbial bus (or illness, accident, or other cause of
death) is perhaps why “the law seems more solicitous of the minor’s (as
well as other’s) rights when the event takes place post-death, which is
also when the interests normally vest.”19 It is not difficult, then, to imagine the cautious jurist denying the parent’s request to divert the bundle of sticks away from minor child B, even if doing so results in a
significant estate tax liability to the family unit, the effects of which will
trickle down, hopefully only indirectly, to minor child B.
For estate planners and those sensitive to economic effects, the
Friedman decision that allowed the incurrence of a deadweight property
loss to the family in favor of the United States Treasury was the wrong
result. While Professor Guzman’s proposal lays a solid beginning foundation for a different legal outcome, the move away from the traditional
approach of evaluating dependent disclaimer petitions toward a presumptive best interests default, including consideration of non-financial
factors, underpinned by a classification of the minor child’s interest to
be disclaimed as non-property, could be challenging for courts to immediately accept. It is possible, though, that buttressing aspects of Professor Guzman’s novel approach to the legal framework with hard-nosed
numbers gleaned from a traditional tax analysis might illustrate to a
court the economic impact in a manner that enhances the chances of a
positive judicial reception to a dependent disclaimer petition.
Consider the value of minor child B’s bundle of sticks sought to be
disclaimed. The facts of Friedman are clear that in parent’s hands, the
18
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bundle is subject to estate tax (the very tax the family unit seeks to
avoid and save via the disclaimer). If parent disclaims, the bundle of
sticks in B’s hands is subject to the same estate tax (hence the need for
the dependent disclaimer). However, what is not discussed in the case
nor by Professor Guzman is that in B’s hands, the bundle will be further
reduced by generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax – an additional
level of tax imposed over and above the estate tax to disincentivize
wealth transfer across multiple generations to avoid or minimize estate
tax – having now passed from grandmother to grandchild. Under section 2603(b) of the Code, the GST tax “shall be charged to the property
constituting such transfer”20 – in other words, not spread among uncle’s
or grandmother’s bundles of sticks, but charged only against B’s bundle.
To add insult to injury, estate tax is imposed on the portion of the bundle of sticks used to pay the GST tax, and under New York law, that
estate tax is apportioned against B’s bundle.21 Meanwhile grandmother’s bundle gets the benefit of the marital deduction, meaning that
since her share generates no estate tax, it also bears none. The effect of
this is that if parent were to disclaim her share or were she to be hit by
the proverbial bus, B’s interest would be significantly reduced by its tax
burden. And, as parent’s disclaimer is contingent upon her being able
to disclaim on behalf of B, the value of B’s bundle reduced by taxes
must be further reduced by the probability that parent will ever disclaim
or will be hit by the proverbial bus or suffer some other calamity that
could cause the bundle to actually vest in B – an appraiser aided by
actuarial tables and other information could assist in computing these
likelihoods. The final bundle may be much, much smaller than the original one.
The point is that even if the judge were not fully convinced to accept Professor Guzman’s classification that B’s bundle is non-property,
presumably with near-zero value, or to wholly abandon a financial evaluation of B’s best interests or to concede to a presumptive best interests
default with respect to the dependent disclaimer petition, the legal arguments advanced by Professor Guzman, including the consideration of
non-financial best interests factors such as family harmony and stability
and overall increased wealth from the sought-after family unit estate tax
savings, which can also be quantified, can be weighed against a quantification of B’s tax- and vesting probability-shrunken rights absent a permitted dependent disclaimer. The combination of Professor Guzman’s
novel approaches with a more traditional judicial best financial interests
evaluation may be a winning one that achieves the ultimate estate tax
savings objective.
20
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I.R.C. § 2603(b).
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 2-1.8 (McKinney 2014).

